

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

TO
Chief, SR

INFO.
Chief, EE; Chief of Station, Germany

FROM
Chief, Bonn Operations Base

SUBJECT
REDWOOD ARABYSS
ARABYSS/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

XXXX

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

Reference: EGNW-4373

See C
Thursday

1. Since the pattern of the ARABYSS/1 operation has been quite consistent from its inception in 1961, and since there has been no other correspondence from Headquarters on this case since our last reports in January 1965, reference appeared out of context to any significant development known to us. We have long been aware of the limited access of ARABYSS/1 to priority information, a point we made in EGFA 36028, 21 December 1961, but agree that if the peripheral information reported by him is of only marginal interest that the direction of this operation be changed.

2. Since the correspondence covering this case spans a period of about four years, it may be well to restate the salient points in response to your queries in reference. At the outset we should emphasize that ARABYSS/1 is not a controlled agent in the classical sense. He is an informant motivated to cooperate with us out of anti-Communist feelings which are more akin to contempt than to hatred. He knows that his high quality performance in the Soviet Union is contributing to the total might of that nation, and feels that his reporting to us can compensate for this in some measure. By character, ARABYSS/1 is a tempestuous person given to pounding the table and shouting in a loud voice, which seems to be his main defense against Soviet excesses. He is also the type of person who immerses himself completely in his work, and who has no time for outside activities. He speaks no Russian and is therefore confined in the collection of intelligence to interpreters and to his own observations. He is, however, an excellent technician and undoubtedly accurate when he makes observations in fields with which he is familiar.

Distribution:

2 - C, SR
1 - C, EE
2 - COS/Germany

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2005

GROUP I - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

EGNW-29305

DATE

17 May 1965

CLASSIFICATION

S-E-C-R-E-T

HQS FILE NUMBER

74-6-449/3

/continued/

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

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3. Our operational relationship with Subject is determined to a large degree by his availability in the West. During these brief periods of time we have concentrated on those aspects of his stay in the USSR which promise possible information of value. We have met in the home of [] because it appears to us as a secure place, and, what is more important, ABABYSS/1 feels secure in his friend's apartment. Because of the limited time that we can spend with Subject a debriefing in depth obviously is not possible, and we suspect that if it were he would not indulge us in an interrogation designed to pry loose possible intelligence or to find security hazards. We also deplore this situation but are confined by the operating factors in this case. On the other hand, if he has information of any interest, he will cooperate to the fullest extent to explore every detail to our satisfaction. In this context we would have appreciated some assessment of Subject's access to information based on his reporting, and of his ability to comprehend accurately the environment in which he lives in the Soviet Union. We assume that since most of the reports we have submitted were not disseminated (among the last are EGN 1956, 1970, 2067, 2069, 2070) that they had no intelligence value. It would have been helpful, particularly in view of Headquarters request for an improvement in the quality of his reporting, had we been given some indication of those areas which you feel deserve more attention. We should hasten to add that such guidance should be based on the actual access which Subject has as indicated by his reporting. This is not to deter from the support we have been given in this case. The requirements in EGN 17144 have been helpful in providing a frame of reference for our debriefing, and we would have been helpless without the maps. We also point out that all the questions in the requirements were covered, and where there is no reporting the agent either had no information, or was too vague to warrant closer questioning.

4. The security aspects of this case are not ideal. However, as Headquarters has stated, it would take a most intensive debriefing into every phase of Subject's stay in the USSR to attain even an appreciation of possible security hazards. We have relied in the past on Subject's own alertness to possible approaches to him, and his report on the Tsitrin incident shows his concern in this matter, which neither he nor we considered casual. We believe that this incident was covered in depth, and was then followed up by all reasonable traces. Obviously Subject is under close KGB scrutiny in the Soviet Union and neither he nor we are under any illusion that the Tsitrin incident could not have had some intelligence purpose. However, we cannot believe that the risks we are taking will be eliminated simply by terminating the agent at this time. He has had a four year association with us which has exposed him considerably to our specific interest in the Soviet Union, and it is unlikely that we can erase these by disassociating ourselves from him at this late date.

5. There are certain positive aspects which support a continuation of our contact with him, and which we believe should be considered. We believe that Subject is alert to any developments in the USSR or observable phenomena which could possibly have an intelligence value, and that he will report such to us. Furthermore, he is involved in a large scale construction program in the Soviet Union that can at any time assume greater significance than heretofore. Finally, he has been associated with at least one Soviet now stationed in Germany, Lev Nikolayevich DENISOV [] with whom a firmer relationship may be developed in the future. However, since we have already determined that Subject's access to priority information probably is non-existing, we suggest that this operation be modified in at least one respect. We propose that Subject not be given PI briefings in the future, and that our

*Basis for Termination
or Inf. SR/O/C*

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USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

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<p>efforts be confined to debriefings and to security orientations. While this will not eliminate all risks, it will deter Subject from making direct efforts to gain information, and will confine him even more clearly than in the past to areas to which he has normal access. Headquarters concurrence is requested.</p> <p>Approved: []</p>		
FORM 53a 8-64 (40) USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION S-E-C-R-E-T	<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED PAGE NO. 3